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INTRODUCTION

Public choice theory has long proclaimed that business interests can
capture regulatory processes to generate economic rents at the expense of
consumers.' Such political exploitation may go unnoticed and unchallenged
for long time periods because, though the rents are captured by a relatively
small number of individuals or firms, the costs are widely diffused over a large
number of consumers.2 The triggering event to expose and mobilize
opposition to the regulatory capture may not arise until a new technology
seeks to challenge the incumbent technology, thus creating a motivated
champion to expose and oppose the regulatory capture and advocate for
regulatory liberalization.
That moment has arrived in the automobile industry. Since the 1950s,
the distribution of automobiles has been pervasively regulated by a patchwork
of state laws promulgated at the insistence of dealers for the ostensible
purpose of preventing unfair exploitation by franchising car manufacturers.3
Among other things, the dealer laws in many states prohibit a manufacturer
from opening its own showrooms or service centers-from dealing directly
with consumers.4 At the time these direct distribution prohibitions were
enacted, the Big Three auto manufacturers (Ford, General Motors, and
Chrysler) completely dominated the U.S. car market, and the dealers argued

I.
See, e.g., KENNETH ]. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND I NDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963) ;
JAMES M . BUCHANAN & CORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOU NDATIONS
OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (Charles K. Rowley ed., Liberty Fund 2004) ( 1 962) ; ANTHO NY
DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC TH EORY OF D EMOCRACY ( 1957) ; MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE TH EORY OF GROUPS ( 1965).
2. James D. Gwarmey & Richard E. Wagner, Public Choice and the Conduct of Refrresentative
Government, in PUBLIC CHOICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 3, 11-12 Qames D. Gwartney &
Richard E. Wagner eds., 1988) (describing "rational ignorance"); MICHAEL T. HAYES, LOBBYI STS
AND LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF POLITICAL MARKETS go ( 1 981) (arguing that concentrated
interests are more likely to generate political and lobbying activity by organized groups than when
interests are diffuse) ; Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339, 367
( 1988) . See generally Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory ofRegulation, 19].L. & ECON. 2 11
( 1 976).
3 . Jessica Higashiyama, State Automobile Dealer Franchise Laws: Have They Become the
Proverbial Snake in the Grass? 2 -4 (Apr. 2009) (unpublished manuscript) , http://ssm.com/
abstract= 1394877.
4. Id. at 12 .
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that they were unable to contractually protect themselves against a franchising
manufacturer unfairly undermining its own franchised dealers at retail.5
Though the U.S. auto market has become considerably more competitive
since the direct distribution prohibitions were enacted, hence diminishing
any power the manufacturers might have to impose draconian contractual
terms, the laws have persisted largely without modification.
The challenge to the status quo has come from the abrupt market entry
of a redoubtable technological challenger to the internal combustion status
quo. In 201 2, Palo Alto, California-based Tesla Motors began selling all
electric vehicles. Tesla, the offspring of entrepreneur Elon Musk-who also
created the online payment service PayPal and the space exploration
company SpaceX-quickly won accolades for its disruptive technology.
Consumer Reports went so far as to call the Tesla Model S the best performing
car of any kind it had ever tested.6 Yet Tesla's greatest market entry challenge
has not been solving the technological problems of creating a battery than
can run for nearly the fuel range of a typical car or the battery swapping and
supercharging infrastructure necessary to grant Tesla drivers recharging
access comparable to filling stations. Rather, its greatest challenge has been
to obtain the legal right to distribute its cars directly to consumers and to
provide aftermarket service to Tesla owners. Across the country, the car
dealers' lobby-often with the support of the legacy car companies-has
invoked either the old dealer laws or obtained legislative extensions of them
to block Tesla's progress. Tesla is fighting a multi-state, multi-front battle in
state legislatures, regulatory commissions, and courts just for the right to
distribute and service its products.
The Tesla story is important on its own terms because of its implications
for innovation in the automotive industry, the dissemination of
environmentally friendly technologies, and energy independence. But it is
also emblematic of a broader problem of economic regulation and frail legal
response-the lack of robust legal tools for the courts to tackle protectionist
or otherwise anti-consumer regulations designed solely to benefit
concentrated economic interests. In the post-Lochner era, courts have been
reluctant to subject protectionist state regulatory schemes to intrusive judicial
review under any legal framework-whether antitrust law, the Dormant
Commerce Clause, Substantive Due Process, or Equal Protection. Only
recently have a few federal courts begun to show some willingness to invalidate
the most egregiously anti-competitive state regulatory schemes as instances of

5. Id. at 1-4.
6. Vuieos: Cars, CONSUMER REPORTS, http://www.consumerreports.org/ cm/video-hub/cars/
hybrids-alternative-fuel/tesla-model-s-201 3201 5-<juick.<frive/ 1 478653900 1 /236624088200 1 (last
visited Nov. 1 4, 2 0 1 5) ("The Tesla Model S electric car is the best performing car ever tested by
Consumer Reports.").

IO WA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 1 0 1 :573

naked economic· protectionism that fail even rational basis review.7 In most
such instances, the political process remains the consumer's sole recourse
with the dreary prospects for political relief that public choice theory suggests.
This Article examines the Tesla wars as a case study in state economic
protectionism and crony capitalism that lay largely unchallenged for decades
until a maverick technology appeared in the market and began radically to
disrupt the status quo. It is a case study that bolsters the conventional public
choice story of capture and rent extraction, but extends it with further
observations about the potential of political capture to injure consumer
interests not only statically through higher prices but also dynamically
through the protection of incumbent technologies against replacement by
new and innovative technologies. And it is a story about the inadequacy of
judicial review, in most of its prevailing flavors, to do much about it.
But if the Tesla story highlights the inadequacy of law to address most
instances of special interest barrier erection through capture of the political
process, it also showcases the potential for a new strand of anti-crony
capitalism politics. The direct distribution battle coincides with other high
profile conflicts between incumbent technologies protected by long
unchallenged laws and new technologies seeking to penetrate the market.
Consider, for example, the ongoing battles between the taxi establishment
and ride-sharing services Uber and Lyft.8 The confrontation between
incumbent and innovative technologies is shaking up traditional political
juxtapositions, such as business versus consumer or free market versus
environmentalist, and inspiring strange bedfellow coalitions. Over time, the
patterns observed in the Tesla wars could contribute to a fundamental
realignment of political coalitions on issues of protectionism and economic
regulation.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II details the anatomy of dealer
protectionism, briefly summarizing the history of American dealer franchise
laws, introducing Tesla's business model, and recounting the highlights of the
Tesla wars to date. Part III analyzes the policy arguments over laws prohibiting
direct distribution. It shows that none of the contemporary arguments against
direct distribution are remotely sustainable and that laws prohibiting direct
distribution can be explained only as capitulation to the dealers' demands for
protection from competition. Finally, Part IV considers the law and politics of
the Tesla wars. Still treading in the long shadows of Lochner, the legal doctrines
most related to invalidating purely protectionist laws-antitrust law, the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, and the
Dormant Commerce Clause-are of relatively little help in combating
7. See generally Steven Menashi & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Rational Basis with &anomic Bite, 8
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTI 1 055, 1058 (20 1 4 ) .
8 . See, e.g., Melissa Sachs, On the Ro ad to $40 Billion, Ridesharing App Uber Hit Uy Lawsuits,
Regulators, THOMSON RElJTERS: KNOWLEDGE EFFECT (Dec. 1 7, 2014), http://blog.thomsonreuters.
com/index.phpIon-the-road-to-40-billion-ridesharing-app-uber-hi t-by-lawsui ts-regulators.
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economic protectionism. However, confrontation between innovation and
establishment may create a new political vocabulary and consciousness and
awaken a rising class of younger, technology-intensive voters to an old public
choice story.
II.

THE ANATOl\1Y OF DEALER PROTE CTIONISM

A. A BRIEF HISTORY OFDEALER FRAN CHISE LAWS
Automotive manufacturer franchising of dealers began in 1 898 with a
franchise by General Motors to sell steam automobiles.9 However, for the first
few decades of the 20th century, manufacturers employed a wide variety of
distribution methods, including dealer franchising, direct distribution
through factory-owned stores and traveling salesmen, and distribution
through wholesalers, retail department stores, and consignment
arrangements . 1 0 Dealer franchising was not the early predominant model. As
automobile consumption intensified, however, the manufacturers found it
necessary to move increasingly to a franchise model in order to focus on their
core competency in manufacturing and find additional sources of capital to
fund their distribution operations. 1 1
The dealer-franchise system with which we are accustomed today grew
out of intensive lobbying efforts by car dealers from the 1 930s to the 1 950s in
response to perceived abuses of the franchise relationship by car
manufacturers.1 2 At that time, the car companies were large, powerful, and
few in number-the Big Three dominated the market. Dealers were largely
"mom and pop" shops, organized on a small scale. 1 3 Manufacturers were able
to secure contracts that imposed draconian terms on the dealers. 11 For
example, during the Depression , Henry Ford kept his factories running at
"full tilt" and allegedly was able to "force" dealers to buy inventories of Model
Ts that they would be unable to sell, under threat of not getting any more

9. Francine Lafontaine & Fiona Scott Morton, Markets: State Franchise Laws, Dealer
Terminations, and the Auto Crisis, 24J. ECON. PERSP. 233, 234 ( 2 0 1 0 ) .
10. Thomas G. Marx, The Development of the Franchise Distribution System in the U.S. Automobile
Industry, 59 Bus . HIST. REV. 465, 465-66 ( 1 985); see also Gary Michael Brown, Note, State Motor
Vehicle Franchise Legislation: A Survey and Due Process Challenge to Board Composition, 33 VAND. L. REV.
385, 387 ( 1980).
1 1 . Brown, supra note 10, at 387.
1 2 . See Higashiyama, supra note 3, at 11.
13. See STEWART MACAULAY, LAW AND THE BALANCE OF PmVER: THE AUTOMOBILE
MANUFACTURERS AND THEIR DEALERS 5-1 2 ( 1 966).
14. See Friedrich Kessler, Automobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration l7y Contract, 66 YALE
LJ. 1 1 35, 1 1 55 ( 1957) ( describing automotive franchise contracts as quintessential contracts o f
adhesion) . See generally CHARLES MAsON HEWITT, JR., AUTOMOBILE FRANCHISE AGREEMENTS 2 3 -40
( 1956) ; BEDROS PETER PASHIGIAN, THE DISTRIBUTION OF AUTOMOBILES, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF THE FRANCHISE SYSTEM ( 1961) .
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inventory in the future if they refused delivery.'5 According to a 1 956 Senate
Committee report, franchise agreements of the 1 950s typically did not
require the manufacturer to supply the dealer with any inventory and allowed
the manufacturer to terminate the franchise relationship at will without any
showing of cause. 16 Conversely, as with the Ford example, the manufacturers
could often force dealerships to accept cars whether the dealer could sell
them or not. '7 Thus, the franchise agreements were perceived as shifting risk
downward to dealers and reward upwards to the manufacturers.
The dealers made some headway in the courts challenging the franchise
agreements as contracts of adhesion. 1 s But the relief they ultimately needed
was legislative. During the 1 930s to 1 950s, the dealers pressured Congress to
enact a statutory scheme protecting them from the power of the Big Three.
They obtained relatively little of what they wanted from the federal
government. A I 9 3 9 report by the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), which
had been encouraged by the car dealers, did find some franchising abuses by
manufacturers, but one of the report's headlines was that the use of
manufacturer power to squeeze the dealers actually created intensive retail
competition to the benefit of consumers.'9 The FTC also turned the tables on
the dealers and accused them of various anticompetitive or anti-consumer
practices, such as "padding" new car prices, price fixing, and "packing"
finance charges-not the news the dealers wanted. 20 Eventually, the dealers
secured a modest federal victory with the Automobile Dealers' Day in Court
Act of 1 956, which allows dealers to bring a federal suit against a
manufacturer who, without good faith, fails to comply with the terms of a
franchise agreement or terminates, cancels, or refuses to renew a franchise. 2 1
The dealers secured more significant victories in state legislatures.
During the same time period, states began to pass statutes governing
automotive franchise relations.•• Today, such laws are on the books in all 50
states.•3 Their terms vary, but they commonly include prohibitions on forcing
dealers to accept unwanted cars, protections against termination of franchise

1 5. James Surowiecki, Dealer's Choice, NEW YORKER (Sept. 4, 2006), http://www.newyorker.
com/ magazine/ 2006/ 09/ 04/dealers-choice-2.
1 6. See S. REP. N o. 2073, at 3 ( 1 956).
1 7. Id. at 2.
1 8 . Higashiyama, supra note 3, a t 4-5.
1 9. FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION FOR THE
FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30 1 939, at 24-25 ( 1 939), https:/ /www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/ reports_annual/ annual-report-1 939/ ar 1 939_0. pdf.
20. Id.
2 1 . 1 5 U.S.C.§ 1 2 2 2 (201 2). Seegimerally Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614 ( 1 985); Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act of 1 956, Pub. L. No. 84-1 026, 70
Stat. 1 1 25.
2 2. Higashiyama, supra note 3, at 1 3 .
2 3 . Id. a t 1 1 .
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agreements, and restrictions on granting additional franchises in a franchised
dealer's geographic market area. 24
The statutory provisions of difficulty to Tesla prohibit a manufacturer
from distributing its cars directly to consumers, effectively requiring the
manufacturer to deal exclusively through dealers.•5 The legislative concern
reflected in these statutes is that if a manufacturer integrated foiward into
distribution, it might compete unfairly with its own franchised dealers by
undercutting them on price.•6 For example, the legislative history of the
Michigan statute reveals that the statute was designed to address "the unequal
power balance between dealers and manufacturers [ that] leaves a great
potential for arbitrary and unilateral decisions by manufacturers about
contract arrangements"•1 in part by forbidding manufacturers "to compete
with franchised dealers by offering the same services." 2s
What is important to note for present purposes is that the direct
distribution prohibitions were expressly justified as part of a package of
protections for dealers against the exercise of superior manufacturer
bargaining power. Manufacturers were assumed to pursue franchisee
relationships-since the Big Three all did-and pure direct distribution was
not considered or discussed. Further, contrary to current efforts by the dealers
to frame these direct distribution prohibitions as consumer protection
measures (discussed in Part III infra) , there is not a whiff of consumer
protection sentiment in these statutes. They were all about protecting dealers
in franchise relationships from the exigencies of superior manufacturer
bargaining power.

B.

TESLA 's DIRECT DISTRB
I U TION S TRA TEGY

The introduction of new products or technologies that compete against
incumbent technologies often requires new methods of distribution.
Examples include "new world" wine companies that bypassed the long,
multilevel value chains used by the old world companies and distributed their
products through tightly controlled full-value distribution chains, 2 9 and e arly
decisions by Dell and Gateway computers to compete against established
personal computer manufacturers by pursuing exclusive built-to-order, direct-

24. Id. at 1 2 .
25. Cynthia Barmore, Tesla Unplugged: Automobile Franchise Laws and the Threat to the Electric
Vehicle Market, 1 8 VA.J.L. & TECH. 1 85, 1 89 (20 1 4) .
26. Id. at 202.
2 7 . MICH. H. LEGIS. A i"IALYSIS SECTION, SECOND ANALYSIS, H.B. 4738, 4740, at I ( 1-26-gg),
http://www .legislature.mi.gov/documents/ 1 997-1 998/billanalysis/House/pdf/ 1 997-HIA-4738B.pdf.
28. MICH. H. LEGIS. ANALYSIS SECTION, H.B. 5072 SYNOPSIS (7-25-77).
29. Christopher A. Bartlett, Global Wine War 2009: New World Versus Old 5 (Harvard Bus.
Sch., Working Paper No. g-g 10-405, 2009).
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to-consumer models.3° There is often an important relationship between
product innovation and innovation in distribution. Incumbent technologies
often have a grip on established distribution channels through embedded
relationships, quasi-exclusive dealing arrangements, and settled customer
expectations, which requires proponents of new technologies to locate or
create new channels of market access.
When Tesla entered the market, it announced that it would not employ
traditional dealer networks but rather open its own showrooms and sell
directly to consumers and service their cars in aftermarkets. It explained its
decision as necessary to ensuring the acceptance of electric vehicle ("EV")
technology. In a blog post, Elon Musk explained that "[e] xisting franchise
dealers have a fundamental conflict of interest between selling gasoline cars,
which constitute the vast majority of their business, and selling the new
technology of electric cars."3' He argued that "[i ] t is impossible for
[traditional dealers] to explain the advantages of going electric without
simultaneously undermining their traditional business. This would leave the
electric car without a fair opportunity to make its case to an unfamiliar
public."32
A 2 0 1 4 study conducted by Consumer Reports bolsters Musk's claims.33
Consumer Repmts sent 1 9 secret shoppers to 85 dealerships in 4 states, making
anonymous visits to showrooms that stocked at least some electric cars
between December 2 0 1 3 and March 2014.34 The shoppers asked salespeople
a variety of questions concerning electric cars, such as about the availability of
"tax breaks and other incentives, vehicle charge time, cost, and options,
vehicle range, and battery life and warranty."3s While Consumer Repmts
encountered "several" well-informed sales people, most were dismally
ignorant about electrical vehicles: "few provided accurate and specific answers
about battery life and battery warranties. And many seemed not to have a good
understanding of electric-car tax breaks and other incentives or of charging
needs and costs."36 Thirteen out of the 85 dealers actively discouraged the
purchase of an electrical vehicle, and 35 out of the 85 recommended buying

30. Case Study: Dell-Distribution and Supply Chain Innovation, MARS DISCOVERY DISTRICT
(Feb. 8, 2 0 1 1 ) , http:/ /www.marsdd.com/mars-library/case-study-dell-distribution-and-supply
chain-innovation; Brian Osborne, Gateway Moves to Ioo % Indirect Distribution, GEEK Ouly 28, 2008,
2:01 PM), http:/ /www.geek.com/ chips/gateway-moves-to-1 oo-indirect-distribution-576848.
3i. Elon Musk, The Tesla Approach to Distributing and Servicing Cars, TESLA: BLOG (Oct. 2 2 ,
201 2), http://www.teslamotors.com/blog/tesla-approach-distributing-and-servicing-cars.
3 2 . Id.
33. Eric Evarts, Dealers Not Always Plugged in About Electric Cars, Consumer Reports ' Study Reveals,
CONSUMER REPORTS (Apr. 22, 2 0 1 4, 8:00 AM), http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/news/
20 1 4/04/dealers-not-always-plugged-in-about-electric-cars-,<;ecret-shopper-study-reveals/index.htm.
34· Id.
35· Id.
36. Id.
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a conventional internal combustion vehicle instead.37 Consumer Reports
concluded with some advice for customers interested in EVs: " [D]o your
homework and don't rely on the dealership for education about this
intriguing technology."38
It is not hard to understand why established dealers prefer to steer buyers
toward internal combustion vehicles even if they carry some electric vehicles
in stock. Electric vehicles require considerably less service than do internal
combustion vehicles. There are no spark plugs, oil, or filters to change, many
software updates are downloaded automatically from the manufacturer, and
self-reported diagnostic tools allow for less prophylactic service.39 Dealers earn
considerably higher margins on service than they do on new vehicle sales,4°
so the sale of an EV entails foregoing a lucrative future income stream.
Although most of the recent media coverage has concerned Tesla, other
recent new entrants into automotive production have also been impacted by
the American distribution system. In 2 0 1 1 , Fisker Automotive, a company
based in Finland, introduced a much-hyped electric car that quickly had
orders from prominent names in Hollywood and Silicon Valley.4• The
company failed and went into bankruptcy in 20 1 2 after being plagued by
production and financing problems.42 Unlike Tesla, Fisker announced that it
would distribute its vehicles conventionally-through independent dealers.43
But, though independent, the dealers Fisker secured were mostly established
dealership networks.44 Since Fisker sold so few cars before going out of
business, there are insufficient data to test whether its dealer distribution

37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Mike Buchanan, Tesla to Continue Transforming the Automotive Industry, This Time with
Seroice, INSIDE EVs, http:/ /www.insideevs.com/tesla-to-continue-transforming-the-automotive
industry-this-time-with-service (last visited Nov. 1 4, 201 5); Nikki Gordon-Bloomfield, 20I2 Tesla
Model S Seroicing: When, Where, How Much, GREEN CAR REP. (Sept. 1 1 , 201 2 ) , http:/ /www.greencar
reports.com/news/ 1 079070_201 2-tesla-model-s-servicing-when-where-how-m uch.
40. Jim Henry, The SU7prising Ways Car Dealers Make the Most Money off You, FORBES: AUTOS
(Feb. 29, 201 2, 3: 19 PM) , http:/ /www.forbes.com/sites/jimhenry/20 1 2/ 02/ 29/the-surprising
ways-<:ar-<lealers-make-the-most-money-off-of-you.
4 1 . Katie Fehrenbacher, A Look Under the Hood: "Why Electric Car Startup Fisher Crashed and
Burned, GIGAOM (Apr. 1 7, 2 0 1 3 , 5:29 PM) , https:/ Igigaom.com/ 2 0 1 3/o4/ 1 7 /a-look-under-the
hood-why-electric-<:ar-startup-fisker-<:rashed-and-burned; Deepa Seetharaman & Paul Lienert,
Special Report: Bad Karma: How Fisher Burned Through $z.4 Billion on a 'Green' Car, REUTERS (June
1 7, 2013, 1 :58 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 201 3/06/ 1 7 /us-autos-fisker-specialrepon
idUSBRE95Go2L201 306 1 7.
42. Seetharaman & Lienert, supra note 4 1 .
43. Darryl Siry, Fisher Makes a Safe Bet on Distribution, WIRED: GEAR (Nov. 5, 2009, 8:30 AM),
http:/ /www.wired.com/ 2009/ 1 1 /fisker-makes-a-safe-bet-on-<listribution.
44. Fisher Recruits First US Dealers for PHEVs; Appoints First Distributors for EurofJe, GREEN CAR
CONGRESS (Mar. 26, 2009 ) , http://www.greencarcongress.com/2009/03/fisker-recruits-first-us
dealers-for-phevs-appoints-first-<listributors-for-europe.html.
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model could have been successful. Tesla, however, believes that Fisker failed
in part due to its decision to distribute through traditional dealer networks.45
Another new entrant into automotive manufacturing offers additional
color to the story. Elio, an American start-up company based in Phoenix,
Arizona, is in the process of mass-producing a three-wheeled internal
combustion vehicle that it says will sell for $6800 and achieve 84 miles per
gallon on the highway.46 On its website, Elio proclaims that it plans to open
its own showrooms and pursue a direct distribution model.47 Unless Tesla
clears the way, Elio will find itself unable to open its own showrooms as it plans
in most states, and will have to scramble to find dealers willing to distribute its
vehicles.
Even Tesla realizes that it may eventually need to pursue a dual
distribution model, with some company-owned stores and some distribution
through independent retailers-a strategy similar to that pursued by Apple.
At upwards of $10,000, the first-generation Tesla is an expensive vehicle
produced and distributed on a small scale. However, after introducing a small
scale second-generation vehicle (an SUV), Tesla plans to bring out its third
generation vehicle on a much larger scale and at a much lower price with the
contribution of a planned battery "gigafactory" being built near Reno,
Nevada.48 Once that happens, Tesla sales may reach a scale where exclusive
distribution through company-owned stores may no longer be viable. Musk
has hinted that it may need to add franchised dealers down the pike.49
C.

THE TEsLA WARS

As of this writing, the Tesla Wars are in full motion, so this brief account
will serve as a mid-stream introduction rather than a historical retrospective.

Still, the two years of skirmishing to date provide an adequate basis to identify
the emergence of themes illustrative of the familiar political capture story.

45. Ben Popper, Auto Dealers Fire Back at Tesla CEO: 'This Musk Guy, He Wants All the Profits
for Himself, VERGE (Mar. 1 9, 2 0 1 4, 1 1 : 1 3 AM), http://www.theverge.com/ 2 0 1 4/3/ 1 9/55255
44/newjersey-auto-dealers-respond-to-teslas-elon-musk (reporting that Tesla CEO Elon Musk
attributed Fisker's failure to its decision to use established dealers).
46. Say Hello to Elio. The Ultra-High-Mileage, Sleek Two-Seaterfor an Incredibly Affordahle Base Price.
ComingFourth Quarter 2016!, Euo MOTORS, http:/ /www.eliomotors.com (last visited Nov. 1 4, 201 5) .
47. Are Dealerships Available t o Purchase?, ELIO MOTORS, https://eliomotors.zendesk.com/
he/ en-us/articles/ 2030 1 4 734-Are-dealerships-available-to-purchase- (last visited Nov. 14, 201 5)
("Elio Motors will not be selling franchises or dealerships. Our plan is to open 1 20 company
owned retail centers in the top sixty markets in the US." ) .
4 8 . Sharon Bernstein, Tesla's Massive Battery Factory Could Make Nevada the 'Richest Place on
Earth Again,' Bus. INSIDER (Oct. 2, 2 0 1 4, 3:01 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/r-tesla
factory-near-reno-is-bet-<>id-nevada-will-meet-the-new-20 1 4- 1 o.
49. Sebastian Blanco, Elon Musk Hints at Need for Franchised Tesla Dealerships, AUTOBLOG
(Oct. 1 5, 20 1 4, 5:00 PM) , http:/ /www .amoblog.com/ 2014/ 1 o/ 1 5/ elon-musk-hints-at-need-for
franchised-tesla-dealerships.
'
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1 . A Potpourri of Laws, Compromises, and Gamesmanship

When Tesla hit the market in 2 0 1 2 and began preparations to open
company-owned showrooms and service centers in various states, the car
dealers' lobby reacted with alarm and sprang into action.5° The dealers
argued that direct distribution was prohibited under the existing laws and that
there should be one set of rules for all car manufacturers. As noted earlier,
however, the 5os-era prohibitions on direct distribution by manufacturers
were justified on the assertion that manufacturers might unfairly undercut
their own franchisees if allowed to open company-owned stores, and the
relevant statutes were written with that concern in mind.5 1 Tesla and the
dealers quickly converged on the defining issue regarding the incumbent
statutes-are statutes written to protect dealers against overweening
manufacturer power applicable to companies that employ pure direct
distribution (i.e., do not use dealers at all)? The results thus far have been a
potpourri of inertia-driven
stalemates,
compromises, and shady
gamesmanship by the car dealers.
As with much of the law, inertia is proving to be a powerful force on direct
distribution. In some states, Tesla has found sufficient wiggle room in the
existing law to open company stores, largely on the argument that the law is
inapplicable to pure direct distribution. In such states, for example Missouri
and Minnesota, the car dealers have agitated for new legislation that would
make the direct distribution ban applicable to pure direct distribution as well,
thus far without success.52 In North Carolina, the car dealers proposed
legislation strengthening the existing North Carolina statute to prohibit pure
direct distribution, but lost after Tesla took the governor and Speaker of the
House for test drives in a Tesla.53 In Georgia, the car dealers have filed a
petition with the Georgia Department of Revenue, arguing Tesla's direct sales
model violates Georgia law.54 As of this writing, Tesla has moved to dismiss the

50. Throughout this Article, I will refer generall y to the "dealers" as a unified and
homogenous group. This is not entirely fair, since some dealers have supported Tesla's fight for
direct distribution. See Jerry Hirsch, "Why AutoNation CE O Jackson Calls Dealer Fight with Tesla
Hypocritical, L.A. TIMES ( Nov. 20, 20 1 4, 1 : 1 8 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/autos /la-fi
hy-why-autonation-calls-tesla-fight-hypocritical-20 1 4 1 1 20-story. html.
5 1 . See supra text accompanying notes 3-5.
52. Steve Alexander, Minnesota Sales of Electric, Gas Cars Collide, STAR TRIB. (Mar. 1 3, 20 1 3,
T 1 3 AM) , http://www.startribune.com/minnesota-sales-of-electric-gas-cars-collide/ 1 97706621 ;
Lindsay Toler, Tesla Remains Legal in Missouri, Legislature to Reconsider Ban Next Year, RIVERFRONT
TIMES (May 1 9, 20 14, S:oo AM) , http://www.riverfronttimes.com /newsblog/20 1 4 /05/1 9 /tesla
remains-legal-in-missouri-legislature-to-reconsider-ban-next-year.
53. James Ayre, Tesla Motors Conquers North Carolina, CLEANTECHNICA (June 30, 20 1 3) ,
http:/Icleantechnica.com/201 3/06/30/tesla-motors-conquers-north-carolina.
54. Urvaksh Karkaria, Tesla Motors Seeks to Dismiss Georgia Dealers' Petition to Ban Tesla Sales,
ATLANTA Bus. CHRON. ( Nov. 1 1 , 201 4 , 5:04 PM) , http://www.bizjoumals.com/atlanta/blog/
atlantech/20 1 4/ 1 1 /tesla-motors-seeks-to-dismiss-georgia-dealers.html.
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petition, arguing that the Georgia law does not apply to pure direct
distribution.55
In other states, inertia has favored the dealers. In West Virginia56 and
Arizona,s7 for example, Tesla has sought legislation that would permit some
direct distribution, but has thus far come up short. In some cases, the existing
laws have been interpreted to prohibit almost any marketing activity by Tesla.
Under the prevailing interpretation of Texas law, Tesla cannot open
dealerships or service centers in the state, but may showcase its cars at galleries
in malls.s8 Tesla employees in the galleries-we dare not call them
salespeople-can show the cars and discuss their technology, but may not
even quote a price.59 In September of 2 0 1 4, the Iowa Department of
Transportation ordered Tesla to halt its plans for three days of test drives in
the state, stating that Tesla could not operate in the state except through
franchised dealers.60 Tesla owners in Minnesota reacted by driving into Iowa
to showcase their cars to prospective buyers.61
In a number of states, Tesla and the car dealers have reached agreements
on compromise legislation allowing Tesla a fixed number of stores in the state:
NewJersey (four dealerships),62 Ohio (three dealerships),63 and Pennsylvania
(five dealerships) .64 The exemption statutes are typically limited to electric
vehicle companies or companies that use pure direct distribution in order to
prevent traditional car companies from taking advantage and opening

55· Id.
56. Laura Reston, Tesla Not Gaining Much Traction in W Va., CHARLESTON GAZETTE-MAIL
(Aug. 10, 201 3), http:/ /www.wvgazette.com/News/ 2 0 1 308090064 (reporting that Tesla faces
substantial obstacles to legislation allowing it to sell direct to consumers in West Virginia).
57. Mike Sunnucks, Tesla Bill on Auto Saks Dead at Arizona Legislature, PHX. Bus .J. (Apr. 1 1 ,
20 1 4, 1 :33 PM) , http:/ /www.bizjournals.com/phoenix/news/ 201 4/04/ 1 I /tesla-bill-on-auto
sales-dead-at-arizona.html.
58. Kathleen Burke, Tesla Sets Up ShofJ in Dallas-Minus Test-Drives and Saks, AUTOMOTIVE
NEWS Oune 1 9 , 2 0 1 4, 4: 1 2 PM) , http://www.autonews.com/article/201406 1 9/RETAIL07/ 1 40
6 1 98 3 6/ tesla-sets-up-shop-in-dallas-m in us-test-drives-and-sales.
59· Id.
60. Joel Aschbrenner, Tesla Test Drives Hit Roadblock in Iowa, USA TODAY (Sept. 25, 2 0 1 4, 4:44
PM), http://www.usatoday.com/storyI money/ cars/ 201 4/ 09/ 24/tesla-test-driveS<ut-iihort-in-iowa/
1 6 1 83133.
6 1 . John Voelcker, Minnesota Tesla Owners Show Banned Model S to Iowa Ekctric-Car Shappers,
GREEN CAR REP. (Oct. 27, 2014), http:/ /www.greencarreports.com/news/ 1 095 1 24_minnesota
tesla-owners-show-banned-model-s-to-iowa-electric-car-shoppers.
62. Mike Ramsey, New jersey Assembly Passes Bill Allowing Tesla Saks: Legislation Still Needs
Approvalb-ySenate and Governor, WALL STREET]. Qune 1 7, 2014, 1 2: 1 6 PM) , http://www.wsj.com/
articles/newjersey-assembly-passes-bill-allowing-tesla-iiales-1 40302 1 78 1 .
63. Jackie Borchardt, Ohio Senate OKs Compromise to Allow 3 Tesla Motors Stores in Ohio,
CLEVELAND.COM (Apr. 1 , 2014, 4: 1 1 PM), http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2 0 1 4/
04/ohio_senate_oks_compromise_to.html.
6+ John Beltz Snyder, Tesla Gets Legal G<rAhead to Sell EVs in Pennsylvania, AUTOBLOG (Aug.
1 1 , 2014, 6:29 PM) , http:/ /www.autoblog.com/ 20 1 4/ 08/ 1 1 /tesla-gets-legal-go-ahead-to-sell-evs
in-pennsylvania.
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company-owned stores. The Washington compromise legislation goes further
and makes a one-time Tesla exception.6s It provides that a manufacturer that
had an existing dealer license as of January i, 2 0 1 4 and distributed only
vehicles of its own brand and did not distribute at all through franchised
dealers may distribute directly in Washington.66 This effectively means that
other future new market entrants will be prohibited from pursuing direct
distribution unless they can cut their own legislative deals.67
With some exceptions, both Tesla and the car dealers seem reluctant to
take their battles to court, preferring to play smaller stakes games before
legislatures and regulatory commissions. Both sides appear to be concerned
about the widespread precedential and "winner takes all" effects that judicial
decisions might have. Although Tesla has publicly argued that direct
distribution bans are unconstitutional,68 it has not filed a lawsuit challenging
their constitutionality. The dealers have brought some legal challenges, but
have thus far lost in court on judicial interpretations of the relevant statutes,
favoring Tesla's arguments that the statutes should not be read to apply to
pure direct distribution.
The dealers' weaknesses in court seem to have motivated them to pursue
legislative protection even more vigorously and, in some cases, nefariously.
Judicial outcomes in New York and Massachusetts, as well as legislative action
in Michigan in 2 0 1 4, showcase these strategic interactions. The principal legal
thorn in the dealers' side has been standing to sue, which often entails a
shallow analysis of the underlying substantive issue.69 In New York and
Massachusetts, the courts dismissed the dealers' challenges to Tesla's opening
of showrooms in those states, finding that the laws intended to protect dealers
in franchise relationships did not entitle the dealers to bring lawsuits against

65. Andrew Thurlow, Washington Governor Signs Tesla Compromise Bill, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS
(Apr. 8, 2 0 1 4, 6:09 PM) , http:/ /www.autonews.com/article/ 201 40408/RETAIL07 I 1 40409
83 7 /washington-govemor-signs-tesla-com promise-bill.
66. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.96. 1 85 ( 1 ) (g) (vii) (20 1 4) (exempting " [a] manufacturer that
held a vehicle dealer license in this state on January 1 , 2014, to own, operate, or control a new
motor vehicle dealership that sells new vehicles that are only of that manufacturer's makes or
lines and that are not sold new by a licensed independent franchise dealer, or to own, operate,
or control or contract with companies that provide finance, leasing, or service for vehicles that
are of that manufacturer's makes or lines") .
67. I n another compromise, the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles allowed Tesla to
apply for a single dealership license. Jonathan O'Connell, Tesla Eyes First Va. Dealership on Tyco
Road in Tysons, WASH. POST (May 30, 2 0 1 4). http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/digger/
wp/ 2 0 1 4/ 05/ 30/ tesla-eyes-first-va-dealership-on-tyco-road-in-tysons.
68. Tiffany Kaiser, Tesla CE O Elon Musk Willing to Take Auto Dealer Fight to Federal Level,
DAILYfECH (Apr. 1 6, 201 3, 1 2: 1 3 PM), http:/ /www.dailytech.com/Tesla+CEO+Elon+Musk+
Willing+ to+Take+Auto+Dealer+Fight+to+Federal+Level/ article30353 .h tm.
69. See William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE LJ. 22 1 , 2 2 8-29 ( 1 988).
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a company that was not using dealers at all.7° In New York, the dealers-wisely,
in hindsight-decided not to appeal the trial court's decision. In
Massachusetts, the dealers appealed to the Massachusetts Supreme Court, and
soon regretted it.
On September 1 5, 2 0 1 4, the Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed the
dismissal of the dealers' complaint on standing grounds. But although
technically only decided on standing, the court's opinion made clear that it
doubted whether the direct distribution petition in the 1 970 Massachusetts
statute applied to pure direct distribution at all. It noted that the direct
distribution prohibition had been included in what was described at the time
as a "Dealers' Bill of Rights" that was meant only to protect dealers in franchise
relationships.71 The court cast doubt on whether a manufacturer that owned
its own stores was even operating a "dealership" within the meaning of the
law.12 It took from the legislative history of the most recent amendments to
the Massachusetts statute an understanding that the dealer franchise statutes
were "intended and understood only to prohibit manufacturer-owned
dealerships when, unlike Tesla, the manufacturer already had an affiliated
dealer or dealers in Massachusetts."73
A wave of panic spread across the dealers' lobby around the country. One
of the most prestigious state supreme courts had ruled that their strongest
bulwark against Tesla-the existing dealer protection laws-did not apply to
pure direct distribution. If other states followed suit, that would put legislative
inertia squarely on Tesla's side. The burden would be on the dealers to pass
new statutes prohibiting pure direct distribution, which they had already
failed to achieve in states like Missouri, Minnesota, and North Carolina.74
What they had been unable to achieve openly, they would have to achieve
through stealth .
The dealers' opportunity arrived soon. In Michigan-home of the Big
Three and hence naturally precarious territory for Tesla-Tesla had been
cautiously planning to enter the market. The existing statute was ambiguous
as to pure direct distribution. It provided that a car manufacturer could not
"[s] ell any new motor vehicle directly to a retail customer other than through
its franchised dealers."75 That little possessive "its" was potentially critical to
the meaning of the statute. The statute assumed that a manufacturer had
franchised dealers. Under a plausible reading, a manufacturer like Tesla that
did not have franchised dealers at all would not be covered and therefore

70. See Mass. State Auto. Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. Tesla Motors MA, Inc., 1 5 N.E.3d 1 1 5 2 , 1 1 57
( Mass. 201 4 ) ; Greater N.Y. Auto. Dealers Ass' n v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 969 N.Y.S.2d 7 2 1 , 882
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 20 1 3 ) .
7 1 . Mass. State Auto. Dealers Ass'n, 1 5 N.E.3d at 1 1 55-56.
72. Id. at 1 1 57.
73. Id. at 1 1 62.
74. See supra notes 52-61 and accompanying text.
75. MICH. COMP. LAWS§445 . 1 574( 1 ) (i) ( 2 0 1 3 ) .
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could open its own showrooms and service centers. Although the Michigan
statute was differently worded than Massachusetts' statute, the Michigan
provision was also in a dealer's bill of rights provision. The Michigan dealers
fretted that, though differently worded, the Michigan statute might receive a
similar interpretation to the Massachusetts statute.
On October 1 , 2 0 1 4, an automotive dealer franchise bill that had been
pending since May of 2014 came to the floor of the Michigan senate.76 The
bill provided for an amendment to the auto franchise statute, but it only
addressed titling fees and had nothing to do with direct distribution. When
the bill came to the floor, a senator who reportedly received campaign
contributions from the auto dealers and whose wife worked for a lobbying
group that represented the auto dealers introduced a floor amendment
making a few seemingly modest changes to the bill.77 One was to strike the
word "its" from the statute. Suddenly, instead of saying that a manufacturer
had to distribute only through "its" franchised dealers, the statute said that a
manufacturer had to distribute through franchised dealers. No longer could
Tesla argue that the current law applied only to manufacturers with franchise
relationships.
The amended bill passed both houses of the Legislature with a single
dissenting vote.78 As the bill went to the Governor's desk, Tesla found out
about it and began to lobby for a veto; it became apparent that few of the
legislators who had voted nearly unanimously for the bill understood that it
was aimed at Tesla. There was some other linguistic clean-up language in
other parts of the bill, so most legislators apparently assumed striking the "its"
was an insignificant technical change. The chair of the Democratic caucus
later was quoted as saying that the Democratic members of the Legislature
had no idea the floor amendment was aimed at Tesla.79 Meanwhile, the bill's
sponsors engaged in some amazing logicaljujitsu, simultaneously arguing that
the bill was not actually anti-Tesla since the existing statute already applied to

76. H.B. 5606, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 201 4). http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/
201 3-20 1 4/billengrossed/House/p�f/ 20 1 4-HEBS-5606.pdf.
77. Stephen Edelstein, Michigan Car Dealers Slip One over on Tesla, Ban Direct Sales: Updated,
GREEN CAR REP. (Oct. 1 6, 2 0 1 4 ) , http://www.greencarreports.com/news/ 1 094966_michigan
car-<iealers-slip-one-<Jver-<Jn-tesla-ban-<iirect-sales.
78. See S. 97-70, Reg. Sess., at 1 78 1-82 (Mich. 2 0 1 4) , http://www.legislature.mi.gov/
(S(zlwptu3wqznkcqqywkfay5gv) ) /documents/2 0 1 3-2014/Journal/Senate/pdf/201 4-SJ-1 0-<J2070.pdf; H.R. 97-73, Reg. Sess., at 1 87g-80 (Mich. 2 0 1 4) , http://www.legislature.mi.gov/
(S(zlwptu3wqznkcqqywkfay5gv) ) I documents/ 2 0 1 3-20 1 4/Journal/House/pdf/ 201 4-HJ-1 O-<J2073.pdf.
79. Vince BondJr., Anti-Tesla Bill Reaches Michigan Governor's Desk, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS (Oct.
1 5, 2014, 1 2 :50 PM), http://www.autonews.com/article/2 0 1 4 1 0 1 5/RETAIL07/ 1 4 1 0 1 9925/
anti-tesla-bill-reaches-michigan-governors-<iesk.
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direct distribution and urged the governor to sign the bill to ensure that the
law "applies to all manufacturers."8°
Rick Snyder, the governor of Michigan, used to be the CEO of Gateway
Computers, which distributed its products only directly to consumers,8• so he
certainly understood the issue. But, in the middle of a tight re-election
campaign, he was in a difficult position. He did not want to veto unanimous
bi-partisan legislation or upset the dealers and Big Three on the eve of the
election. In order to obtain cover, Snyder asked the Michigan Attorney
General for an opinion as to whether the existing law already prohibited pure
direct distribution. Without citing any legal authority resolving the issue or
acknowledging that it was at minimum contestable, the Attorney General's
chief legal counsel replied that it did.82 Snyder then signed the bill, explaining
that it was not anti-Tesla after all since Tesla was already prohibited from
direct distribution.83 It was as if a runner kneecapped a competitor, won the
race, and then claimed that he would have won anyway since he was faster.
No one was fooled by Snyder's explanation that the bill was not anti
Tesla. Scores of news media headlines across the country riffed on some
variation of "Michigan bans Tesla."84 The Information Technology &
Innovation Foundation named Michigan one of four winners of its annual

So. Greg Gardner, Michigan Weighs Whether to Bar Tesla, USA TODAY (Oct. 19, 2014, 5:00
AM), http:/ /www.usatoday.com/story/money/ cars/20 1 4/ 1 0/ 1 9/michigan-tesla/ 1 7544663.
8 1 . See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
8 2 . Letter from Rick Snyder, Governor, State o f Mich., to Mich. House o f Representatives
& Mich. Senate (Oct. 2 1 , 2 0 1 4 ) , http://www.michigan.gov/documents/snyder/HB_5606_
Signing_Letter_4 72039_7 . pdf.
83. In his signing statement, Snyder offered an explanation for the deletion of the word
"its" that can only be fairly characterized as ludicrous: "This change would appear merely to allow
manufacturers who do not have their own franchised dealers to sell through another
manufactuerer's [sic] network of franchised dealers." Id. The suggestion that the problem being
solved was that, say, Chevrolet would want to sell Corvettes through Ford dealers, is too
preposterous to take seriously.
84. See, e.g., Greg Gardner, Gov. Snyder Signs Bill Banning Direct Tesla Sales, DETROIT FREE
PRESS (Oct. 22, 2 0 1 4, 1 1 :22 AM), http://www.freep.com/story/money/cars/general-motors/
2 0 1 4/ 1o/ 1 7/michigan-verge-banning-tesla-stores/ 1 73862 5 1 ; Jeff Gilbert, Governor Snyder Signs
Michigan Tesla Ban, CBS DETROIT (Oct. 2 1 , 2014, 3:29 PM), http://detroit.cbslocal.com/
2 0 1 4/ 1 o/ 2 1 I govemor-signs-michigan-tesla-ban; Chris Isidore, Tesla Blocked from Selling in
Michigan, CNN MONEY (Oct. 2 1 , 20 1 4, 3:42 PM) , http://money.cnn.com/20 14/ i o/2 1 /
news/ companies/tesla-michigan; Micheline Maynard, Michigan to Tesla Motors: You're Not Welcome,
FORBES (Oct. 2 1 , 2014, 1 :33 PM) , http://www.forbes.com/sites/michelinemaynard/201 4/
1 o/2 1 /michigan-to-tesla-motors-youre-not-welcome; Lucy Nicholson, Michigan Becomes Fifth U.S.
State to Thwart Direct Tesla Car Sales, REUTERS (Oct. 2 1 , 2014, 5:40 PM) , http://www.reuters.com/
article/201 4/ 1o/2 1 /uHesla-motors-michigan-idUSKCN01A2MR20 1 4 1 02 1 ; Robert Sorokanich, GM
Supports Anti-Tesla Bill in MI, Snyder Signs into Law, ROAD & TRACK (Oct. 2 1 , 201 4, 1 0:45 AM), http://
www.roadandtrack.com/car-culture/videos/a6309/michigan-govemor-snyder-signs-gm-backed-anti
tesla-bill-into-law.
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"Luddite Award" based on the new legislation.8s Even the Wall Street]ouma�
Snyder's usual bosom buddy, issued an editorial chastising the Governor for
signing protectionist anti-Tesla legislation.86
The Tesla wars continue. As of this writing, pro-Tesla bills are under
consideration in Michigan and Texas, and more will be on the table in 2 0 1 5 .
Thus far, neither side has been able to move the needle in state legislatures
except through compromise or (as in Michigan) stealth. The state regulatory
commissions have tended to favor the dealers and the courts Tesla.

2.

The Big Three's Cautious Waiting Game

With the National Automobile Dealers Association and state dealer
associations doing the heavy lifting, the Big Three domestic automobile
companies have not had to take the lead in opposing Tesla's innovative
distribution model. Nonetheless, two out of the three-General Motors and
Ford-have supported the dealers in blocking direct distribution, with GM
taking the more aggressive position.87 (To my knowledge, Chrysler has stayed
silent.) GM and Ford have explained their position as simply seeking equal
treatment for all car manufacturers.88 While that argument is plausible, the
story is somewhat more complex.
The legacy car companies' incentives with respect to direct distribution
are mixed. On the one hand, especially with Internet-enabled marketing
reducing some of the transactions costs of distribution, the legacy companies
would probably benefit from doing some direct distribution of their own. In
1 999, Ford dipped its toes into the water. It set up a website to re-sell used
Fords that had been previously leased, used as service vehicles, or rented out
by national car rental companies.89 Interested customers could place a $300

85. Robert Sorokanich, Gau. Snyder's Anti-Tesla Law Wins Michigan the "Luddite Award", CAR
& DRIVER Oan. 8, 20 1 5, 1 0:23 AM), http://blog.caranddriver.com/gov-snyders-anti-tesla-law
wins-michigan-the-luddite-award.
86. Rick Snyder Drives off the Road: Michigan '.s Pro-Market Gauernor Embraces the CarDealer Cartel,
WALL STREET J. (Oct. 24, 2 0 1 4, T 1 8 PM) , www.wsj.com/ articles/ rick-snyder-drives-off-the-road1 4 1 4 1 92688.
87. Justin Lloyd-Miller, Tesla's Public Appeal Falls Short as Michigan Bans Direct Sales, CHEAT
SHEET: AUTOS (Oct. 2 2 , 2 0 1 4) , http:/ /www.cheatsheet.com/automobiles/teslas-public-appeal
falls-short-as-michigan-bans-direct-sales.html/?a=viewall ("We applaud Gov. Snyder's action of
signing HB 5606. The bill will provide a level playing field for all automobile manufacturers
selling vehicles in Michigan . . . . " (quoting Ford ) ) ; Jared Meyer, 'Anti-Tesla Bill'Means Economic Loss
for Michigan, TOWNHALL (Oct. 25, 2014), http://townhall.com/columnists/jaredmeyer/2014/10/
25/antitesla-bill-equals-an-economic-loss-for-michigan-n 1 909263/page/full (reporting that both
GM and Ford supported the Michigan bill) ; David Shepardson, GM Backs Anti-Tesla Michigan Bill,
DETROIT NEWS (Oct. 2 1 , 2 0 1 4, 1 2:22 PM), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/business/autos/
general-motors/2 0 1 4/ 1 0/ 2 1 /tesla-bill-michigan/ 1 766258 1 ("We believe that House Bill 5606
will help ensure that all automotive manufacturers follow the same rules to operate in the State
of Michigan; therefore, we encourage Governor Snyder to sign it . . . . " (quoting GM) ) .
88. See supra note 87.
89. Ford Motor Co. v. Tex. Dep't of Transp., 264 F.3d 493, 499 (5th Cir. 200 1 ) .
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refundable deposit and then inspect the car after it was delivered to a
participating dealer.9° If the customer opted to purchase the vehicle at the
Ford-determined "no-haggle price," Ford would receive payment from the
customer and then transfer the title through the dealer, which was paid a fee
for its service.91 This model did not cut out the dealers entirely, but provoked
sufficient consternation among the dealers that the Texas Department of
Transportation shut it down under the Texas dealer franchise law.92 As will be
discussed further in Part IV, Ford mounted and lost Equal Protection and
Dormant Commerce Clause challenges. Its experiment with direct
distribution ended.
But if the legacy car companies have some interest in direct distribution,
they also can use legal barriers to direct distribution to slow the advent of rival
technologies on the market. As discussed in the previous section, new
technologies often require new distribution methods. It follows that
incumben t technologies can slow the competitive onset of new technologies
by securing the enactment of laws requiring distribution through
conventional methods. Even though some of those distribution methods
might be advantageous to the incumbents also, shutting off those distribution
methods may provide a net gain to the incumbents if it disadvantages new
entrants more than it disadvantages the incumbents.93 To the extent that the
legacy companies view Tesla and other EV entrants as dangerous, competitive
threats, supporting bans on direct distribution may be an effective tactic to
slow Tesla's market penetration.
A letter from GM to Ohio GovernorJohn Kasich exemplifies the tensions
in the legacy companies' position.94 GM wrote Kasich to oppose the ultimately
successful legislative bill that allowed Tesla to establish three dealerships in
the state.95 GM stressed its economic contributions to the state of Ohio and
its opposition to "unique, favorable protection" for Tesla.96 It pointed out the
"highly competitive" nature of the car market and asserted that "Tesla would
gain a distinct competitive advantage by avoiding restrictions that all other
auto manufacturers face in Ohio. "97
Reading between the lines, GM effectively argued that direct distribution
is more efficient than dealer distribution and, hence, that a company able to

go.

Id.
Id.
92. Id.
93. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals'
Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE LJ. 209, 275-76 ( 1 986) .
94. Letter from Selim Bingo!, Senior Vice President, Glob. Commc'ns. & Pub. Policy, Gen.
Motors, to John Kasich, Governor of Ohio (Mar. 5, 2014) [hereinafter Kasich Letter] , http:/ I
insideevs.com/ general-motors-sends-an ti-tesla-letter-ohio-governor.
95. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
96. Kasich Letter, supra note 94.
97. Id.
gi.
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distribute directly obtains a competitive advantage over its rivals. But if that is
so, it is hard to understand the conclusion that follows in GM's letter-that
direct distribution should be prohibited for everyone. If direct distribution is a
more efficient means of distribution, the logical implication is that it should
be allowed for everyone.
For now, GM's political calculation seems to be a combination of a fear
of being outflanked by Tesla and an u nwillingness to anger its dealers by
entering the fray on the side of direct distribution. Additionally, GM realizes
that the amount of political capital necessary to reverse the decades-old direct
distribution bans in their entirety is considerably greater than that necessary
to achieve small-bore exemptions for a new entrant. But as Tesla or other EV
makers gain traction in the longer run, there may reach a tipping point where
some amount of direct distribution appears inevitable and the legacy
companies begin to demand the same rights for themselves.
Another tipping point may occur as Tesla reaches a larger scale. As Tesla
gains wider market acceptance, it will likely find that the small number of
dealerships allotted to it in the compromise statutes do not suffice. Further, it
m ay become economically prohibitive to run a full-scale distribution network
on its own. As noted earlier, Elon Musk has publicly acknowledged that Tesla
m ay eventually need to move to a dual distribution model, as Apple has now.98
Expanding the number of dealerships and moving to dual distribution would
require a new round of legislative action, since the existing compromise laws
are generally written with caps and only apply to manufacturers pursuing pure
direct distribution. If and when Tesla enters its second generation as a
company and must fight its second round in state legislatures, it may find itself
in the company of a wider coalition of manufacturers, including some of the
legacy American companies and Asian or German companies.
The current set of legislative compromises, political alliances, and
outcomes is inherently unstable. In the longer run, there will likely be an even
more aggressive confrontation between the dealers and a wider coalition of
automobile manufacturers.99
III. POLICY ARGUMENTS

A.

VERTICAL INTEGRATION: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

In the context ofliberalizing antitrust rules concerning vertical restraints,
the Supreme Court has remarked that restrictive antitrust rules have
sometimes induced firms "to integrate forward into distribution," cutting out
franchisees or independent distributors altogether.1°0 As Ronald Coase
observed in The Nature ofthe Firm: Influence, whether a firm decides to perform
98. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
99. Preemptive federal legislation is another possibility, although the fact that there are many
dealers in every Congressional district may make it difficult to pass significant reform legislation.
1 00.
Sta te Oil Co. v. Khan, 5 2 2 U.S. 3 , 1 6- 1 7 ( 1 997) .
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any particular commercial function, such as distribution, in house or to buy
that service on the market, is a function of the respective transactions costs of
the two choices. 101 Firms have many reasons for preferring direct distribution.
Vertical integration into distribution may minimize transactions costs10• and
protect against free-riding by rival manufacturers. 1 03 Some manufacturers that
distribute primarily through independent retailers retain some factory-owned
stores in order to set a benchmark for evaluating franchisees' performance
and testing new products or distribution methods. Manufacturers may also be
concerned about the exercise of market power by retailers, which could lead
to double marginalization, in which each successive link in a vertical chain of
firms with market power sets prices above marginal costs in a way that reduces
the profits of the manufacturer and reduces consumer welfare. 1 04 As noted
earlier with respect to Tesla specifically, a manufacturer may be concerned
that the retailer will make insufficient investments in the promotion of the
manufacturer's brand.10s
There are also many reasons for a manufacturer to prefer franchised or
independent distribution of its products under certain market circumstances.
Distributing through dealers allows the manufacturer to lower its costs, by
having other firms absorb the predominant share of the distribution costs,
and focus on its core competencies in manufacturing. 106 Dealers may also
have superior local market knowledge or expertise in distribution . 1 07 And to
the extent that dealers are carrying multiple brands in a single store or
distribution system, franchising (or dealer distribution) may allow the
manufacturer to achieve economies of scale or scope.108
There is no a priori reason to expect that either integration forward into
distribution or distribution through dealers will be a preferable strategy for a
firm as a general matter. Nor is there any general reason for the law to favor
one form or the other. Under most market circumstances, competition and
the profit-maximization incentive will push manufacturers to choose the most
efficient distribution method-whether pure direct distribution, pure dealer
distribution, or some mixed model. The question is whether there is anything

1 0 1 . R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm: 11!fiuence, 4].L. ECON. & 0RG. 33, 3 9 ( 1 988) .
1 02 . OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HI ERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS 84 ( 1 975) .
1 03. Henry N. Butler & Barry D. Baysinger, Vertical Restraints of Trade as Contractual Integration:
A Synthesis of Relational Contracting Theory, Transaction-Cost Economics, and Organization Theory, 32
EMORYLJ. 1 009, 1 084 ( 1 983) .
I 04.
JEAN TIROLE, TH E THEORY OF I NDU STRIAL ORGANIZATION 1 6g-203 ( 1 988).
1 05. See supra text accompanying notes 33-3 7.
I 06.
See generally ROGER 0. B LAI R & FRA NCI NE LAFONTAI NE, THE ECONOMICS OF FRANCHISING
I ( 2005).
107. Id. at 1-2.
1 08. F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, I NDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 54 1 -42 (3d ed. 1 990).
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unique about car distribution that would justify mandating a particular form
of distribution.

B.

THE DEALERS ' FRAIL ARGUMENTS FOR PROHIBITING PURE DIRECT DISTRIBU TION

The dealers have presented a variety of arguments in public debate for
restrictions on direct distribution. Some of their arguments are simply paeans
to the virtues of the dealer franchise system, reasons that manufacturers
should embrace dealer distribution. I do not consider such arguments here
since they are not responsive to the issue actually raised by prohibitions on
direct distribution. Surely there are economic benefits to franchising or
independent distribution, and one would expect to see some manufacturers
continue to embrace franchising or dual distribution in an unregulated
market. If the dealers are correct that franchised distribution is more efficient,
any manufacturer foolishly choosing a different strategy will be punished in
the market and soon repent. The only relevant question is whether
manufacturers should be prohibited from opening their own showrooms and
service centers.
As noted earlier, the dealer franchise statutes passed in the 1 950s were
explicitly styled as dealer protection laws and justified as protecting dealers
from the superior bargaining power of manufacturers. 109 Since, as the
Massachusetts Supreme Court held, pure direct distribution does not impact
these concerns, the dealers have attempted to reframe these prohibitions as
"consumer protection" measures. " 0 The dealers' efforts to transform these
dealer protection statutes into consumer protection statutes are remarkably
unpersuasive.
i.

Breaking the Manufacturer's "Retail Monopoly"

The dealers usually lead with, and lean most heavily on, the argument
that distribution through dealers is necessary to reduce prices to consumers.
A conventional form of this argument goes like this: Unless required to
distribute through dealers, manufacturers enjoy a monopoly over the
distribution of cars in their own brand. Manufacturers will exploit this market
power to raise retail prices above competitive levels. With multiple dealers
distributing the manufacturer's product, consumers will obtain lower prices

1 og. See supra Part II.A.
1 1 0. See Chris Kardish, Automaker Tesla Takes Fight to North Carolina, AssOCIATED PRESS (May
25, 2 0 1 3, 1 2:34 PM) , http:/ /www.apnewsarchive.com/ 2 0 1 3/Automaker_Tesla_takes_fight_to_
North_Carolina/id-c2c1 86809b1 qge8bdo1 484fga2257fg ("'It's a consumer protection,' said
Bob Glaser, president of the [North Carolina Automobile Dealers Association] ."); see also
Aschbrenner, supra note 59 ( noting that Bruce Anderson, president of the Iowa Automobile
Dealers Association, called licensing a "consumer protection" measure ) .
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through intra-brand competition. 1 1 1 This argument is counter to economic
theory, empirical evidence, and the dealers' own admissions.
First, the argument contravenes economic principles by assuming that a
manufacturer will attempt to extract a retail monopoly mark-up over and
above the profit-maximizing wholesale price. A manufacturer's price, whether
at wholesale or retail, will reflect the full exercise of the manufacturer's
market power, if any. 1 1 2 I f the manufacturer embeds its market-power
premium in its wholesale price, it cannot increase its profits by adding an
additional retail mark-up. 1 1 3 Such a mark-up would decrease its profits
because demand at retail would necessarily be elastic, hence the manufacturer
would see a decline in demand for its product. As the Supreme Court
recognized in the vertical restraints context, the interests of consumers and
of manufacturers are aligned on the question of retailer market power
neither favor it. 1 14
Indeed, if anything, vertical integration by manufacturers should result
in a lowering of retail prices, even if there are no efficiencies or cost savings
to vertical integration. If both the manufacturer and the retailers in its brand
have some degree of market power, then distribution through dealers could

1 1 1 . See, e.g.,JeffCobb, Why Auto Dealer Associations oppose Tesla, HYBRJDCARs (May 2 1 , 2 0 1 3 ) ,
http:/ /www.hybridcars.com/why-auto-clealer-associations-oppose-tesla ("Now to m e fewer
dealers drives the price up . . . . The price doesn't go down when they have fewer outlets. And
when they talk about the manufacturer being able to save more selling direct, there's nothing
that says they pass that along to the customer." (quoting Bill Wolters, President, Texas Auto
Dealers Association) ) ; Jonathan Collegio, Reply to Dan Miller, Should Tesla (and Other Auto
Manufacturers) Be Able to Sell Cars Directly to Consumers?, OUR ENERGY POLICY (Oct. 27, 2 0 1 4, 9:09
PM), http:/ /www.ourenergypolicy.org/should-tesla-and-0ther-auto-manufacturers-be-able-to-sell
cars-directly-to-consumers/#comments (noting that car companies "would not have the same set
of incentives to keep costs down that dealers have, because they would not have competitors within
the same brand. (E.g. two Chevy stores owned by GM can't really compete with each other in the
same way as two business owners with skin in the game) "); Michael Martinez & Michael Wayland,
Snyder Weighs Pulling Plug on Direct Tesla Sales, DETROIT NEWS (Oct. 1 6, 2014, 1 : 1 6 PM) , http://
www.detroitnews.com/story/business/autos/ 2 0 1 4/ 1 o/ 1 6/ tesla-faces-direct-sales-ban-michigan/
1 7359253 ("For consumers buying a new car today, the fierce competition between local dealers
in any given market drives down prices both in and across brands . . . . If a factory owned all of its
stores, it could set prices and buyers would lose virtually all bargaining power." (quoting Charles
Cyrill, spokesman for the National Automobile Dealers Association) ) ; Tesla Business Model in NJ.
'Unlawful': Appleton, BLOOMBERG Bus., http://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/b/53f689ff
aco1-4dff-b2c6-1 2c927679073 (last visited Nov. 1 4, 2 0 1 5) [hereinafter Market Makers] (James
Appleton, President, New Jersey Coalition of Automotive Retailers, appearing on Bloomberg
Television "Market Makers" on March 1 2, 2 0 1 4, and asserting that a manufacturer has a
"monopoly" in retail distribution) .
1 1 2 . SCHERER & Ross, supra note 1 08, at 541-42 (explaining that an upstream monopolist
would prefer to sell to a downstream competitive firm); see also Michael L. Katz, Vertical Contractual
Relations, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 655, 665 (Richard Schmalensee &
Robert D. Willig eds., 1 989).
1 1 3. PHILLIP AREEDA & LOUIS KAPLOW, A NTITRUST A.'IALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CAsES
489 (5th ed. 1 997) ("The power already possessed by the . . . monopolist to control the price and
output . . . effectively controls the price and output of independent [downstream firms] .").
1 1 4. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 5 5 1 U.S. 877, 896 (2007) .
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result in double marginalization, as discussed above. 1 1 5 Conversely, vertical
integration by the manufacturer would create an incentive to lower retail
prices . 1 1 6
A second reason to doubt the dealers' argument i s empirical. In 2 009 ,
the United States Justice Department published a competition advocacy paper
by its Economic Analysis Group that analyzed the effects of state bans on
direct distribution . 1 1 1 Relying o n a n earlier study b y Goldman Sachs, the
report found that direct distribution could save consumers on average $ 2 2 2 5
o r about 8.6% per vehicle . 1 18 These savings arose from improvements i n
matching supply with customer demand, lower inventory, fewer dealerships,
lower sales commissions, and lower shipping costs . 1 1 9 I am unaware of any
empirical evidence suggesting that distribution through dealers lowers prices
to consumers.
Finally, it is quite apparent that the dealers do not believe that mandatory
distribution through franchisees results in higher prices. For one, it
contravenes their longstanding assertion that manufacturers should not be
allowed to compete against their own franchisees because they would
undercut them on price. Moreover, the dealers' private legal strategies against
Tesla depend on a showing that Tesla would undermine them on price. In
Massachusetts, for example, the dealers found themselves i n a battle over
standing. They argued that they had suffered injury because direct
distribution by Tesla would lead to "inequitable pricing," to their
detriment.1 20 Of course, "inequitable" has to mean "too low," otherwise the
dealers would not have suffered cognizable inj ury. 1 2 1

1 1 5. See supra notes 1 04--05, 1 1 0-1 3, and accompanying text.
1 1 6. A study of Spanish auto distribution market, where direct distribution is permitted,
found that vertically integrated sales outlets have considerably lower profitability than franchised
dealership. See Benito Arrmiada et al., Contractual Allocation of Decision Rights and Incentives: The
Case ofAutomobile Distribution, 1 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 257, 275 (2001 ) .
1 1 7. GERALD R. BODISCH, ECON. ANALYSIS GRP., ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF STATE BANS ON
DIRECT MANUFACTURER SALES TO CAR BUYERS ( 2009 ) , http://wwwJustice.gov/sites/default/
files/atr/legacyI 2009/ 05/ 28/ 24637 4.pdf.
1 1 8. Id. at 4. There is a question as to how much of these marginal costs savings would be
passed on to consumers. Under standard economic assumptions, consumers would receive at
least half of the savings even if the manufacturer were a monopolist. See generallyJeremy I. Bulow
& Paul Pfleiderer, Comment, A Note on the Effect of Cost Changes on Prices, 91 J. POL. ECON. 1 8 2
( 1 983) . I n a competitive market-which the automotive market i s today-they would receive the
substantial majority of the marginal cost savings.
1 1 9. BODISCH, supra note 1 1 7, at 4.
1 20. Mass. State Auto. Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. Tesla Motors MA, Inc., 15 N.E.3d 1 1 5 2 , 1 1 59
(Mass. 2014) ; see also Greater N.Y. Auto. Dealers Ass'n v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 969 N.Y.S.2d
72 1 , 878 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 20 1 3) (discussing dealers' claims that they will suffer "competitive
economic injury" from direct distribution by Tesla) .
1 2 1 . Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., LTD v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582-83 ( 1 986)
(explaining that competitors lack standing to challenge prices that are allegedly too high, since
any such prices help rather than hurt competitors) .
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In arguing that direct distribution increases consumer prices, the dealers
have cited Tesla's one-price, no-haggle policies as harmful to consumers'
interests . 1 2 2 Whether no-haggle policies are, as a general matter, good or bad
for consumers is uncertain, 1 23 but that has little to do with whether permitting
direct distribution is good for consumers. As noted, a manufacturer cannot
increase its profits by marking up retail prices to reflect a retail market power
premium and direct distribution can create process efficiencies, lower
marginal costs of distribution, and eliminate double marginalization
regardless of whether the manufacturer allows or prohibits retail haggling.
The consumer price reduction theory is farcical. It is possible that retail
distribution through independent dealers could lower prices to consumers,
but only if the dealers were more efficient at retail distribution than the
manufacturer. But, in that case, the manufacturer would have every incentive
to distribute through dealers, which would increase its wholesale sales (which
would still embed the full market-power premium) and hence its profits.
Regulation is not necessary to prevent the exploitation of market power in
this context. To the contrary, it has the effect of denying manufacturers and
consumers a more efficient means of distribution.

2.

Assuring Adequate Levels o f After-Market Service

A second "consumer welfare" argument offered by the dealers is that
dealer distribution is necessary to ensure that customers receive adequate
levels of service. 1 24 But there is no reason to think that manufacturers like
Tesla have any incentive to offer subpar service through their company-owned
stores. Car manufacturers make multi-billion-dollar investments to create new
car technologies and brands, investments they cannot recoup without
creating long-term customer loyalty. In the case of EV technology, these

I 2 2 . Peter Valdes-Dapena, Tesla 's Fight with America s CarDealers, CNN MONEY (May 20, 20I 3,
3:04 PM) , http://money.cnn.com/20I 3/05/20/autos/telsa-car-dealers.
I 23.
See Xiaohua Zeng et al., The Competitive Implications of a "No-Haggle" Pricing Policy:
The Access Toyota Case 23-24 (Sept. g, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), http://rady.ucsd.
edu/faculty/seminars/2008/papers/weinburg.pdf (finding in an empirical study of no-haggle
policy by Toyota that the consumer welfare effects could not be conclusively determined); Preyas
S. Desai & Devavrat Purohit, "Let Me Talk to My Manager": Haggling in a Competitive Environment,
23 MARKETING SCI. 2 I g, 2 I g-2 2 (2004) .
I 24. Daniel O'Connor, Tesla, the Auto Dealers and New Jersey: Playing the Consumer Protection
Card, DISCO (Mar. I I , 2 0 1 4 ) , http://www.project-disco.org/competition/03 I 1 1 4-tesla-the-auto
dealers-and-newjersey-playing-the-consumer-protection-card ("David Hyatt, VP of Public Affairs
for the National Automobile Dealers Association, echoed a similar talking point when he said,
'the franchise dealer network promotes public safety and instills confidence in the consumer that
there will be a place to go when help is needed.'") ; id. ("Bob Glaser, head of the North Carolina
Dealers Association, made a similar argument in discussing his association's push for even more
restrictive legislation that would ban all I nternet car sales from the manufacturer to North
Carolina residents: 'It's a consumer protection [issue] . . . and why we say that a dealer who has
invested a significant amount of capital in a community is more committed to taking care of that
area's customers.'" (alteration in original) ) .
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incentives are particularly acute, since Tesla not only has to create new EV
technologies, but is investing heavily to develop supercharging and battery
swap infrastructures necessary for broad deployment of its cars . 1 25 Without
creating brand loyalty, including through adequate levels of after-market
service, it cannot hope to recoup these sunk investments.
Ironically, it is the direct distribution prohibitions themselves that are
impairing Tesla's ability to provide after-market customer service. Since the
statutory prohibitions typically apply not only to car sales but also to after
market service, Tesla is prohibited from opening service centers in many
states. Customers in those states can still buy Tesla vehicles off a truck from
Tesla or by traveling to other states, but they cannot access Tesla service in
their home state.
The dealers have argued that dealer distribution ensures that there will
be someone available to service the cars if a manufacturer goes bankrupt, as
happened with Fisker. 1 26 This argument is also unfounded. For one, it
assumes that the likely failure rate of car manufacturers is higher than that of
car dealers, which seems counterintuitive. Second, it assumes that the
availability of post-market service depends upon the presence of franchised
dealers. A franchised dealer of a defunct manufacturer will only continue
providing service in a particular brand if servicing that brand with customers
paying out of pocket remains profitable. If it does, then there is no reason
that only a franchised dealer would offer service. As noted earlier, Fisker
announced a dealer distribution model.121 After its bankruptcy, many owners
were left orphaned without adequate service through dealers, at which point
a company called Hybrid Support Solutions came along and began offering
Fisker owners annual support packages for $4000. 1 28 With respect to Fisker
a dealer franchise company-the companies rescuing orphaned buyers have
reportedly not been dealers, but other third parties looking to make a
profit. 129 There is no reason to think that mandating distribution through
dealers will protect customers in after-markets.

1 25. Don Sherman, Tesla Across America: How Elon Musk Is Building an EV Infrastructure, CAR
& DRNER (Oct. 2 0 1 3 ) , http:/ /www.caranddriver.com/features/how-tesla-and-elon-musk-are
building-an-ev-infrastructure-feature.
See Valdes-Dapena, supra note 1 2 2.
1 26.
1 27. See supra text accompanying notes 4 1 -44.
1 28. Antony Ingram, Orphaned Fisker Owners Offered $1K/Year Seroice Contract by . . Whom?,
GREEN CAR REP. (May 30, 2 0 1 3 ) , http://www.greencarreports.com/news/ 1 084484_orphaned
fisker-owners-offered-4k-year-service-contract-by-whom.
1 29. Patrick George, UsedFiskerKarmasAreSellingfor50 % o.ffMSRP,JALOPNIK (May 1 7, 2013, 1 0:02
AM), http://jalopnik.com/used-fisker-karmas-are-selling-for-50-0ff-msrp-508 1 87464 (reporting that
many Esker owners felt stranded by Fisker's bankruptcy, but that third parties might step up to provide
setvice).
.
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Complying with State Regulatory Requirements

The dealers have also argued, without much elaboration, that automobile
distribution is pervasively regulated and that dealer distribution is necessary
in order to ensure compliance with state regulatory requirements, such as
titling, registration, lemon law protection, and the like . 1 3° To be sure,
automobile distribution is pervasively regulated, but it hardly follows from
that observation that distribution must be mandated to occur through
dealers.
The implicit structure of the dealers' argument must be that dealers have
a higher regulatory compliance rate than manufacturers. I am unaware of any
support for that assumption. If anything, the average regulatory compliance
rate might be higher with company-owned stores than with independent
franchises. According to the Consumer Federation of America and Better
Business Bureau, consumers complain about car dealerships more than any
other business i n the United States.'3' Empirical evidence shows that larger
scale firms enjoy economies of scale in achieving regulatory compliance,
which suggests that smaller scale firms, including smaller dealerships, might
be more prone to regulatory non-compliance than large-scale
manufacturers. 1 32
There is no reason to believe that car manufacturers would be less
compliant on average than dealers if allowed to engage in direct distribution.
Further, if it turned out that company-owned stores were more compliant with
state regulatory requirements than independent dealerships, the logical
implication of the dealers' argument would be that dealer distribution should
be prohibited and direct distribution mandated. 1 33 Presumably, this is not an
argument that the dealers would be interested in exploring to its logical
conclusions.
4.

Ensuring Vehicle Safety

The dealers have argued that prohibiting direct distribution promotes
vehicle safety because dealers have greater incentives than do manufacturers

1 30. See, e.g., Jonathan Collegio, Reply to OurEnergyPolicy.org, Should Tesla (and Other Auto
Manufacturers) Be Able to Sell Cars Directly to Consumers?, OURENERGYPOLICY.ORG (Oct. 27, 2014,
3: 2 3 PM), http://www.ourenergypolicy.org/ should-tesla-and-other-auto-manufacturers-be-able
to-sell-cars-directly-to-consumers/#comments; see also Aschbrenner, supra note 59.
1 3 1 . See Nation 's Tap Ten Consumer Complaints, CONSUMER FED' N AM. Qui. 3 1 , 2 0 1 3 ) , http://
www.consumerfed.org/news/696; Consumer Complaint Surveys, CONSUMERS FOR AUTO RELIABILITY
& SAFETY ( 2 0 1 4 ) , http:/ /www.carconsumers.org/sul>'eys.htm.
1 32 . WILLIAM A. BROCK & DAVID S. EVANS, TH E ECONOMICS OF SMALL BUSINESSES: THEIR
ROLE AND REGULATION IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 65 ( 1 986) ; JACK FAUCETT Assocs., ECONOMIES OF
SCALE IN REGULATORY COMPLIANCE: EVIDENCE OF THE DIFFERENTIAL IMPACTS OF REGULATION BY
FIRM SIZE I ( 1 984) .
1 33. See generally NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, UNIV. OF CAL, SANTA BARBARA, Two CH EERS FOR
VERTICAL INTEGRATION: CORPORATE GoVERNANCE I N A WORLD OF GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS ( 2 0 1 4 ) ,
http:/ I f.hypotheses.org/wp-content/blogs.dirI 989/files/ 2 0 1 4/ 03/Lich tenstein-2. pdf.
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to pursue safety recalls. 1 34 Dealer lobbyists point to recent scandals involving
GM's failure to issue timely safety recalls, leading to a number of deaths, as a
reason that the manufacturers cannot be trusted on recalls. 135 But,
inconveniently for the dealers, the GM recall failures all occurred in the
context of franchised distribution. So if the dealership model is supposed to
serve as a guarantor of vehicle safety, then the GM recall failures are failures
of the dealership model, not reasons to require it.
Whether a manufacturer distributes directly or through dealers has
nothing to do with the incidence or servicing of recalls. Dealers do not make
recall decisions. Under federal law, the obligation to report vehicle safety
defects to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA")
rests solely on the manufacturer. 1 36 The submitting manufacturer then
proposes a remedial program, which is reviewed for approval by the
NHTSA.137 When manufacturers fail to implement recalls requested by
NHTSA, the agency may issue an administrative order requiring a recall.1 38
This entire process is run by the manufacturers and the NHTSA without
dealer involvement.
The dealers have also argued that, once a recall is issued, the dealers have
a greater incentive to see it performed than do the manufacturers, since the
manufacturer is paying the dealer to perform the service.139 But this argument
assumes that, having issued an NHTSA-mandated recall, a manufacturer
owned service center will refuse to perform the service when customers
request it. That would be a flagrant and easily detectable violation of federal
law, and there is no reason to think it would be a systematic problem.
5.

Dealers as Uniquely Virtuous Local Citizens

A final argument advanced by the car dealers is more faithful to the spirit
of the original dealer protection laws insofar as it admits that the laws protect
the dealers from manufacturer competition. But this protectionism isjustified
on the ostensible grounds that the dealers are unique bastions of virtue in
local communities because they pump in tax revenues, employ people, make
large philanthropic contributions, and preserve small business values. 14° It is
hard to take these arguments seriously.
1 34· Get the Facts: The Benefits ofFranchised New Car Dealers, NAT'L AUTOMOBILE DEALERS Ass'N,
http://www.nada.org/GetTheFacts (last visited Nov. 14, 20 1 5) (arguing that dealers " (t]ake the
side of consumers in warranty and safety recalls") .
1 35· Market Makers, supra note 1 1 1 .
1 36. NAT'L HIGHWAYTRAFFIC SAFElYADMIN., U.S. DEP'TOF TRANSP., SAFE1YRECALL C0MPENDIUM
4 (n.d.), http://www-0di.nhtsa.dot.govIcars/problems/recalls/documents/ recompendium. pdf.
1 37· Id. aq.
1 38. Id. at 1 5 .
1 39· Market Makers, supra note l l L
1 40. John O'Dell, '!Wiy Tesla Should Stop Fighting Auto Dealers, CNN (Mar. 1 8, 20 1 4, 6:08 PM) ,
http:/ /www.cnn.com/ 2 0 1 4/ 03/ 1 8/ opinion/odell-tesla-newjersey (opining that "car dealerships
are important corporate citizens, pumping into the national economy hundreds of millions of sales-
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First, to the extent that manufacturer-owned stores displaced dealer
owned stores, the effects would be tax neutral. Internet direct sales models
not involving a physical presence by the seller in the state may reduce state
and local sales tax revenues, but the issue in question is not pure Internet sales
but rather opening brick and mortar stores and service centers in the states.
Any such stores would remit the same real estate, sales, franchise fee, and
other state and local taxes as independent dealers. If anything, since Tesla can
and does already conduct Internet sales, adding a physical store in the state
might increase state and local tax revenues.
The argument that direct distribution would lower local employment
rates by cutting out a sales force is also off the mark. Tesla already engages in
direct distribution and Internet sales, but is prohibited from opening stores
and service centers in many states. If it opened those stores and service
centers, it would need to hire a l ocal workforce to run them. To the extent
that the dealers' argument is that Tesla would run its stores and service centers
in a more streamlined way than dealers do and hence employ a smaller sales
force, they are effectively arguing for mandating a less efficient means of
distribution. It seems prima facie undesirable to mandate dealer distribution
just to protect inefficient distribution models that create needless jobs.
The point about local philanthropic giving is also fishy. According to the
dealers' own self-survey, fewer than half of the dealers donated more than
$2 5,000 to non-profit organizations or charitable causes in 2 0 1 3 . 1 41 Is the rate
of charitable contribution greater on average for car dealerships than for
other industry sectors? I know of no evidence that it is. Even if it were, it would
be inefficient to subsidize charitable organizations by granting a particular
industry a protected position against competition on the hopes that it would
share with charities some of the monopoly profits it extracted from
consumers. It would be far more efficient for the states simply to levy a general
tax on consumers and redistribute the proceeds to worthy causes.
Finally, the picture of car dealers as "mom and pop" shops, or to quote
Justice Peckham 's famous aphorism "small dealers and worthy men," 142 is
increasingly misguided. Although small dealerships remain, particularly in
rural areas where manufacturers are unlikely to open company-owned stores
anyway, automotive retailing in suburban and urban areas has become big
business. Many dealers are part of large groups comprising many different

tax dollars, tens of millions of dollars in charitable contributions and billions of dollars in
paychecks") ; Popper, supra note 45 (" [Tesla] wanted to go direct, which means no sales force. That's
cutting out a lot of people." (quoting a car dealer) ) .
1 4 1 . Auto Dealers Increase Charitable GWing, Focu.wn Local Communities, ALLY (Oct 1 3 , 2014), https:/I
media.ally.com/ 20 1 4-1 0-1 3-Au to-dealers-increase-chari table-giving-focus-on-local-<:ommuni ties.
1 42 . United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 1 66 U.S. 290, 323 ( 1 897) ("Trade or
commerce under those circumstances may nevertheless be badly and unfortunately restrained by
driving out of business the small dealers and worthy men whose lives have been spent therein,
and who might be unable to readjust themselves to their altered surroundings.") .
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dealerships. For example, in 20 1 2 , the 33 largest dealer groups in the country
each had revenues in excess of $ 1 billion, with the two largest groups showing
revenues of about $ 1 5.7 and $ 1 3. 2 billion respectively, and an average of
nearly 23 dealerships in the group.'43 The ten largest car dealer networks in
America have combined revenues of over $80 billion, which puts them at
roughly the GDP of the entire country of Croatia. ' 44 The 1 ooth largest dealer
group's annual revenues still exceed $300 million.'45 Even putting aside the
impact of large group ownership, individual dealership revenues averaged
$6. 1 million in 2 0 1 3 , with a net pre-tax profit of over $ 1 million. • 46 The
economies of scale from this organization of capital may help the dealers meet
the heavy regulatory burden under which they ostensibly labor, but it surely
disqualifies any argument that dealers should be favored as small businesses
as a general matter. • 47
IV. THE LAW AND P OLITICS OF THE TESLA WARS

A.

LOCHNER 'S LONG SHADOW AND

THE FRAIL TY OFJUDICIAL REVIEW

Stripped of their frail efforts to transform unequivocal dealer protection
laws into consumer protection provisions, and unable to rely on the original
unequal bargaining power argument since pure direct distribution involves
no manufacturer-dealer contract, the dealers are exposed as nakedly seeking
protection from competition. One need not fault the dealers for promoting
the original franchise protection statutes to understand their current
resistance to direct distribution as another chapter in the long story of crony
capitalism. Dealer distribution is deeply engrained as the model, a habit of
mind for manufacturers, consumers, and dealers alike. Never mind that the
economic conditions of the market and relevant technologies have
completely shifted over the last half century. The dealers see direct
distribution as a mortal threat and the existing laws as their property, their
constitutional charter.
There is little doubt that the use of dealer franchise laws to block pure
direct distribution is naked protectionism from competition for the benefit of
car dealers. I will take it for granted that such a use of law should be curtailed.
But it is a long step from that realization to obtaining relief from the judiciary.
In the post-Lochner world, judges are shy about policing even blatant crony
capitalism because assuming that role would often involve them in making

1 43. WARDSAUTO DEALER Bus., WARDSAUTO: MEGA DEALER 1 00, at 22-25 ( 2 0 1 3) , http://
wardsauto.com/site-files/wardsauto.com/files/uploads/ 20 1 3/ 04/UsaDeo2_20 1 3.pdf.
1 4+ Id.; The World Factbook, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/ rankorder/ 2001 rank.html (last visited Nov. 1 4, 2 0 1 5) .
1 45. WARDSAUTO DEALER BUS., supra note 1 43, at 24-25.
1 46. NADA, NADADATA: ANNUAL FINANCIAL PROFILE OF AMERICA'S FRANCHISED NEW-CAR
DEALERSHIPS 3 (2014), https://www.nada.org/workarea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=2 1474839497.
1 47. See supra Part lll.B.3.
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socio-economic j udgments that would usurp the will of the democratically
accountable branches of government. The doors ofjudicial relief are ajar, but
barely.
Antitrust law would seem an obvious instrument, but it is unavailable
because of the Parker state action doctrine, which permits states to enact even
nakedly anticompetitive legislation so long as the anticompetitive policy is
clearly and affirmatively expressed as state policy and actively supervised by
the state. 148 The Parker doctrine arose immediately in the wake of the Supreme
Court's rejection of Lochnerism and reflected a resolve by the Court not to
reinstate economic substantive due process under the mantle of the federal
antitrust laws. 149
That leaves constitutional doctrines, in particular the Dormant or
Negative Commerce Clause and Equal Protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment. As noted earlier, Ford lost both challenges to Texas' direct
distribution ban in the Fifth Circuit. 15° Dormant Commerce Clause challenges
can succeed either by demonstrating unjustified discrimination against out
of-state commerce or that "the burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is
clearly excessive in relation to .the putative local benefits."151 The Fifth Circuit
court reasoned that there was no discrimination against interstate commerce,
since all car manufacturers, wherever domiciled, were similarly prohibited
from engaging in direct distribution. 1s2 It also rejected Ford's balancing-test
argument, finding that even if direct distribution would produce efficiencies
for the benefit of consumers, a statute that curtailed efficiencies did not
impose "a constitutional burden."153 The state's asserted justifications for
prohibiting direct distribution-"to prevent vertically integrated companies
from taking advantage of their incongruous market position and ' to prevent
frauds, unfair practices, discrimination, impositions, and other abuses of our

1 48. Parker v. Brown, 3 1 7 U.S. 34 1 , 352 ( 1 943); see also Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 102-04 ( 1 980).
1 49· See Merrick B. Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the Political
Process, 96 YALE LJ. 486, 500 ( 1 987) ("Having only just determined not to use the Constitution
in that manner, the Court was not about to resurrect Lochner in the garb of the Sherman Act.") ;
Paul R. Verkuil, State Action, Due Process and Antitrust: &jlections on Parker v. Brown, 7 5 COLUM. L.
REV. 328, 330-34 ( 1 975) (explaining the Court's decision in Parker through the lens of anti
Lochner sentiment) .
1 50. See supra notes 89-g2 and accompanying text.
1 5 1 . Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 3 2 2 , 3 3 1 ( 1 979) (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,
397 U.S. 1 37, 1 42 ( 1 970) ). See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AllfERICfu'\I CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1 03 1 , 1057 (3d ed. 2000) .
1 5 2 . Ford Motor Co. v. Tex. Dep't of Transp., 2 64 F.3d 493, 502 (5th Cir. 200 1 ) ("It is
irrelevant [under the Texas statute] whether Ford, as a manufacturer, is domiciled in Texas or
Michigan. In either circumstance, it is similarly prohibited from engaging in retail automobile
sales in Texas."). The Fifth Circuit relied heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in Exxon Corp.
v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 1 1 7 ( 1 978) , which upheld a Maryland statute prohibiting oil
producers or refiners from operating retail service stations in the state. See id. at 500-0 1 .
1 53. Id. at 503.
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citizens"'-were
legitimate
interests
supporting
the
statute's
constitutionality. 154 The court rejected Ford's Equal Protection Clause
challenge for the same reason, finding that the direct sales prohibition bore
"a reasonable relationship to the State's legitimate purpose in controlling the
[automobile] retail market. " 1 55
Despite the Ford precedent, there are glimmers of hope for a challenge
to bans on pure direct distribution. None of the unfair bargaining power
arguments that have proven successful in upholding dealer protection laws1s6
have any purchase as to manufacturers that avoid dealers altogether. And
should the mantra of "frauds, unfair practices, discrimination, impositions,
and other abuses [of our] citizens"1 s1 require affirmative proof as opposed to
mumbo-j umbo assertion, the dealers will find themselves in constitutional
trouble for all of the reasons explored in Part III.
The success of any such challenge hinges on the current valence of the
judiciary's post-Lochner resolution not to kick the tires on a state's purported
justifications for nakedly protectionist regulations. There is little hope for
meaningful judicial review if the courts refuse to invalidate a protectionist law
on rational basis grounds "if there is any conceivable state of facts which would
support it," whether or not that actual state of facts exists, has been asserted
by the state, or has support in the record. 1s8 But if the courts demand more
actual empirical support, even if contestable, and logical consistency-then
the direct distribution bans will be susceptible to challenge.
In the last decade, the federal appellate courts have begun to require
more than boilerplate assertion from states defending statutes that seem, at
first blush, nakedly protectionist. For example, the Fourth Circuit invoked the
Negative Commerce Clause in striking down a Virginia statute granting
motorcycle dealers protest rights whenever a franchising manufacturer
opened a new dealership in the Commonwealth, even outside the dealers'
geographic market area. •sg The purpose of the statute was plainly to grant
dealers the power to exact concessions from manufacturers, but the
Commonwealth tried to justify it as preventing dealer "oversaturation . "160
Although paying lip service to the general principle that courts should rarely
cast doubt on "a statute 's putative benefits," the court nonetheless pushed

1 54. Id.
1 55. Id. at 510 (alteration in original ) .
1 56. See, e.g., New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 ( 1 978) (upholding dealer
franchise laws intended to protect dealers from the superior bargaining power of manufacturers).
1 57. See, e.g. , ARK. MOTOR VEHICLE COMM'N, SYNOPSIS (n.d.) , http://www.amvc.arkansas.
gov/pdf/amvc_sum.pdf.
1 58. Carmichael v. S. Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 509 ( 1 937); see also Williamson v. Lee
Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 ( 1 955) .
1 59. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v.Jim's Motorcycle, Inc., 401 F.3d 560 (4th Cir. 2005 ) .
1 60. Jd. at 570-7 1 .
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back sharply on the "putative benefits," finding them ill-served by the
statute. 161
Other courts have shown similar teeth-what Judge Ginsburg has called
"rational basis with economic bite"-in invalidating protectionist legislation
under the Equal Protection Clause.162 The two leading cases both involve state
restnct10ns that essentially granted funeral homes protection from
competition in casket sales. 163 If the question were whether such
protectionism could have some conceivabl,e rational basis other than naked
transfers of wealth, 1 64 the answer would have to be yes. Yet, in striking down
those statutes, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits demanded more than the
conceivable . Against a backdrop principle that "protecting a discrete interest
group from economic competition is not a legitimate governmental
purpose," 1 6s the courts scrutinized the states' asserted purposes for empirical
support and logical consistency and, finding those qualities wanting,
invalidated the statutes. The "protecting a discrete interest group from
economic competition" principle is not your grandfather's rational basis
review. 166 It articulates a distinct and testable limit on the exercise of the state's
police powers that requires more justification by the state than invitations to
armchair imagination.
If this principle crystallizes as a distinct mode of constitutional analysis,
the restrictions on pure direct distribution should be in serious trouble. A
broad coalition of 7 2 distinguished economists and law professors recently
penned an open letter calling the direct distribution ban "protectionism for
auto dealers, pure and simple." 167 If that claim is correct, as argued in Part III,
the direct distribution bans would fail rational basis scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause.
Still, Lochnels shadow looms large, and the model federal judge resists a
return to the days of economic substantive due process. Soberly assessing the
odds, Tesla has thus far shied away from provoking a constitutional challenge.
For now, its stronger hand lies in the court of popular opinion and state
legislatures.

1 6 1 . Id.
1 62. See generally Menashi & Ginsburg, supra note 7.
1 63. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 7 1 2 F.3d 2 1 5 (5th Cir. 2 0 1 3 ) ; Craigmiles v. Giles, 3 1 2 F.3d
2 2 0 (6th Cir. 2002).
1 64. Cf Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the OmstitutWn, 84 CoLUM. L. REV. 1 689, l 695--g6
( 1 984) (defining naked transfers of wealth as government resource redistribution absentjustification
by an articulated public value).
1 65. Craigmiles, 3 1 2 F.3d at 224; see also Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 991 n . 1 5 (9th Cir.
2008) ("We conclude that mere economic protectionism for the sake of economic protectionism is
irrational with respect to determining if a classification smvives rational basis review.").
1 66. Craigmiles, 3 1 2 F.3d at 2 24.
1 67. Letter from Int'! Ctr. for Law & Econs. to Chris Christie, Governor of NJ. 1 (Mar. 26,
20 1 4) , http://www.laweconcenter.org/images/articles/tesla_letter_icle.pdf.
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B. A NEW ANTI-PROTECTIONIST POUTICS ?
In conventional public choice theoretic terms, economic special interests
are able to capture the political process and extract rents because of collective
action problems: the concentrated benefits to the special interests induce the
expenditure of political resources up to the value of the rents, whereas the
diffuse nature of the harm to consumers, taxpayers, or other wide social
groups impede mobilization of an effective response. 1 68 The history of direct
distribution regulation reflects this pattern. The Big Three gave up on waging
any kind of serious fight against dealer protectionism decades ago, and since
then, the car industry as a whole has largely acquiesced. Although consumers
bear the brunt of the protectionism, the consumer interest is too fragmented
and dispersed to be easily mobilized. It has taken entry by a well-capitalized
firm wielding a new technology and with sufficient disincentives to acquiesce
in the industry' s longstanding settlement to break open a fight with the
dealers.
The political dynamics of the Tesla wars make for strange bedfellows. The
car dealers lean overwhelmingly Republican, 169 which may help to explain
their considerable leverage in Republican-dominated state legislatures. On
principle, however, dealer protectionism sits uneasily in the Republican
stable. The Tesla wars have seen Republican Governors like Chris Christie,
Rick Perry, and Rick Snyder chided for anti-free-market policies by news
sources such as the National Review11° and the Wall Streetjournal.171 Meanwhile,
sensing the opportunity to bolster his free-market credentials, another
potential 2 0 1 6 Republican Presidential nominee, Florida Senator Marco
Rubio, took to CNBC to blast New Jersey's anti-Tesla measures. 1 72
The pro-direct distribution themes resonate with the economic
libertarianism of the right, but also with consumer protection and
environmentalist themes usually associated with the left. The senior staff

1 68. See supra text accompanying notes 1-2.
1 69. Josh Barro, Republicans Are Only Sometimes the Party of Uber, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2014),
http://www. nytimes.com/ 2014/ 1 1 I09/ upshot/ republicans-are-only-sometimes-the-party-of-uber.
html?_r=o&abt=ooo2&abg= 1 ; Nate Silver, News Flash: Car Dealers Are Republicans (It's Called a
Control Group, People) , FIVETHIRlYEIGHT: POL. (May 27, 2009, 1 0:50 PM), http://fivethirtyeight.
com/features/news-flash-car-dealers-are-republicans.
1 70. Jim Geraghty, Rick Perry on the Effort to Tum Texas Blue, NAT'L REV.: CORNER (Mar. 7,
2014, 1 :44 PM) , http:/ /www.nationalreview.com/ corner/ 372877 /rick-perry-effort-turn-texas
bluejim-geraghty.
1 7 1 . Rick Snyder Drives Offthe Road: Michigan 's Pro-Market Governor Embraces the Car Dealer Cartel,
WALL STREET ]. (Oct. 24, 2 0 1 4, T 1 8 PM), http:/ /www.wsj.com/articles/ rick-snyder-drives-off
the-road-1 4 1 4 1 92688; see a/,so Matt Friedman, Christie Says Tesla Criticism Is 'Complete Crap, 'NJ.COM
Uuly 1 6, 20 1 4, 3:43 PM), http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/201 4/07/christie_calls_tesla_
criticism_complete_crap.html ("I don ' t like the law either. I didn't vote for it. I didn't sign it. But
I don't get to just ignore the laws I don't like." (quoting Governor Chris Christie) ) .
1 72 . Jeff Morganteen, Sen Rubio: Allow Tesla to Sell Direct to Consumers, CNBC (Mar. 25, 2 0 1 4,
9: 1 8 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/ 1 0 1 522333.
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leadership of the Obama FTC have come out publicly in support of direct
distribution on pro-consumer grounds. 1 73 A wide range of academics from
across the political spectrum have signed pro-Tesla open letters advocating
direct distribution . ' 74 Meanwhile, an unusual coalition of free market,
environmentalist, pro-consumer, and pro-technology groups, including such
strange bedfellows as the Institute for Justice, Americans for Prosperity,
Environment America, the Sierra Club, Consumer Action, and the Consumer
Federation of America, have joined an open letter calling on states to allow
direct distribution of automobiles. '75
The Tesla wars offer an opportunity to re-introduce and re-explain the
problematics of economic protectionism and special interest capture,
particularly to those of the environmentally conscious, "on demand," and
technology-savvy younger generations accustomed to being able to buy
anything over the Internet. The issue's pan-ideological appeal provides
opportunity for politicians of any stripe to burnish their credentials across
traditional partisan lines: conservative Republicans can invoke dealer
protection as evidence that violation of free market principles interferes with
carbon emission reduction and harms consumers' pocketbooks; liberal
Democrats can explain how e nhanced competition can create positive
environmental, technological, and consumer welfare effects. Despite its
political perils, 1 76 direct distribution is sitting on a silver platter, waiting for
opportunistic paladins on either side of the political spectrum.
Public choice theory has long been suspected of serving as a covert anti
regulatory tool of the right. ' 77 The Tesla wars offer an opportunity to retell

Andy Cavil, Debbie Feinstein & Marty Gaynor, Who Decides H(JUJ Consumers Shap?, FED. TRADE
(Apr. 24, 2 0 1 4, 1 1 :00 AM), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/competition
matters/ 201 4/04/who-decides-how-consumers-should-shop.
1 7 4. See supra note 1 6 7 and accompanying text.
1 75. Letter from Am. Antitrust Inst. et al. to State Government Leaders (Feb. 1 6, 2015),
http://www2.itif.org/ 201 5-tesla-big-ten t-letter.pdf; see also Dana Hull, Koch Brothers, Sierra Clubjoin
Tesla in Fight with Dealers, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Feb. 1 7, 2 0 1 5, 1 0: 1 4 AM), http:/ /www.bloomberg.
com/ news/articles/ 201 5-02-1 7/koch-brothers-sierra-clubjoin-tesla-in-fight-with-<lealers.
I 76.
Apart from statements by the independent FTC, the Obama administration has thus far
declined to weigh in. In response to a pro-Tesla petition, the Obama White House issued a tepid
statement observing that "regulating auto sales are issues that have traditionally sat with lawmakers at
the state level." Dan Utech, Response to We the People Petition on Tesla Motors, WHITE HOUSE (July 1 1 ,
2014), https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/response/response-we-people-petition-tesla-motors.
1 77. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The Common
Law in the Age of the New Public Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 87 5, 884 ( 1 99 1 ) ("Conservatives who are
suspicious of government have foun d in public choice a congenial catalogue of political
misdemeanors . . . ."); Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and
"Empirical" Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 1 99, 204 ( 1 988) (offering a critical
perspective on "right-wing public choice literature") ; Simon Lazarus, Stripping the Gears of National
Government: Justice Stevens s Stand Against judicial Subversion ofProgressive Laws and Lawmaking, 1 06 Nw.
U. L. REv. 769, 77fr77 ( 20 1 2) (referring to "conservative academics'jaundiced 'public choice theory'
perspective on modem democratic pluralist institutions"); Mark V. Tushnet, Does Constitutional
Theory Matter?: A Comment, 65 TEX. L. REV. 777, 782-83 n . 1 5 ( 1 987) ("The entire literature
1 73.
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the story: long-entrenched technologies and interests rely on the inertial pull
of decades-old regulatory captures to subvert the emergence of new
technologies capable of vastly improving consumer welfare, putting clean cars
on the streets, and reducing carbon emissions and dependence on foreign
oil. Consumers and voters are slow to understand and react because of
informational asymmetries and the diffuse and non-obvious nature of their
injury. Courts are reluctant to second-guess the legislative decisions on
constitutional grounds, fearing a return to an era ofjudicial activism on socio
economic matters. Until motivated coalitions of public interest groups
mobilize to fight back, crony capitalism will continue to exert a strong inertial
force.
V.

CONCLUSION

In the familiar Schumpeterian story, brutal industrial contest between
old and new technologies is the "essential fact" about capitalist economic
organization: 1 18 that incumbent technologies will resist the new entrants by
erecting and bolstering legal and regulatory entry barriers should be assumed,
and that they will often be successful in at least slowing the new technology's
expected momentum. The current alliance of manufacturers and dealers of
internal combustion vehicles against the onslaught of EVs is hardly the first
such instance in the history of the American transportation industry. For
example, in the 1 920s, the American Horse Association mobilized to block
the spread of internal combustion technologies by lobbying for laws against
heavy trucks on public roads and granting horses special legal status in urban
areas.'79
The Tesla wars are important for the issues directly at stake-the
proliferation of EV technology and all of its associated implications for the
environment, energy policy, and automotive innovation . They are also
significant as a contemporary, sharply definable, and ideologically mixed
paradigm of special interest capture and crony capitalism.

on public choice can be seen to support a right-wing version of representation-reinforcing
review . . . . ) ; cf. D. Daniel Sokol, Explaining the Importance of Public Choice for Law, l 09 MICH. L.
REV. 1 029, 1 03 1 (20 1 1 ) (reviewing MAxWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE
CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW (2009) ) (arguing that the view of public choice theory as a
right-wing tool is misguided while pointing to a number of left-leaning scholars who employ
public choice analysis) .
1 78. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 83 ( 2d ed. 194 2 ) .
1 79. Alan L. Olmstead & Paul W. Rhode, The Agricultural Mechanization Controversy of the
lnterwar Years, 68 AGRIC. HIST. Soc'Y 35, 40-4 1 ( 1 994) .
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